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STATEMENT 01' THE CASE
This case was brought by Plaintiffs, after judgment had
been obtained against them on a

not~

held by defendant Bank

of Ephraim, to force defendant Bank to apply security held
by them against the debt before proceeding against the
Plaintiffs on the judgment obtained, and for damages against
all defendants arising out of various charges of interference
with business relations and harrassment.

Defendants Barton

counterclaimed on various grounds, including obligations due
from the Plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN 'IHE LOWER COURT
After trial before the Honorable- Peter F. Leary, Judge
in the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven
of Plaintiffs' causes of action were dismissed by tt.e Court
and the remaining three causes of action were submitted to
the jury, resulting in verdicts for Defendants and against
Plaintiffs.

The counterclaim of defendant BeEtha Barton was

disrr•issed by the court, as was one counterclaim of defendant
George Barton; the remaining five countE·rclaims of defendant
George E2rton were subn;i tted to the jury, resulting in
verdicts for defendant
against

defend~nt

B~rton OL

three causes of action and

BaEton on two causes of acticn.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

l

-

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respcandents respectfully request the Court to sust.ain
the judgment given by the court below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents essentially agree with the statement of
facts set forth in Appellants' brief, with the following
exceptions:
1.

Appel] ants refer (p. 3 of Appellants' brief) to

various "considerations" allegedlj' given by Kennedy to
Barton to induce Barton to endorse Kennedy's note with the
Bank of Ephraim.

Plaintiffs disagree that .:.ny such considera-

tions were received by Barten.

In particular, a check for

$499.98 given by Kennedy to Barton at the time of the leoan
from the Bc.nk of EFhraim is alleged by Kennedy to have be£r,
a "commission" or "finde:r's fee".

The record shows con-

flicting evidence as to the nature of this check; Barton's
testimony (R. 801-802) was to the effect ttat this was a
payment on an exist.ing debt, and not in any EEr,se a "finder's
fee".
2.
against
of

Appellants' reference to the prior judgment obtainec
the~

in Sanpete County, Utah on July 19, 1973 (p.

~ppellants'

brief) does not fully explain the circum-
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stances surrounding that judgment.

These circumstances are

explained in the affidavit of Judge Ma"L·.r_ice Harding, who
tried the case on June 29, 1973 (copy of affidavit is
contained on R. 311-312).

In that affidavit, Judge HarC.ing

explains that Charles Kennedy, who was a defendant in that
action, on the day befc·re the trial requested anotter
continuance on the basis of defendant Rebecca Kennedy's
medical condition.

The court instructed Kennedy at that

time that a continuance would only be granted if defendant
Rebecca Kennedy obtained a medical certificate stating that
her medical condition would not allow her to appear in
court.

Defendants Kennedy failed to provide the certificate

and failed to appear in court on the following day - the day
of the trial - although they were represented there by
counsel.

After evidence was heard by the court, defendants'

counterclaim was dismissed by the court and judgment was
entered in favor of plaintiff Bank of Ephraim.
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ARGUMENT
THE JUDGMENTS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS WHICH REQUIRE THEM TO PAY
THEIR DEBTS OWING TO THE BANK OF EPHRAIM SHOULD BE UPHELD.
Plaintiffs advance numerous theories throughout their
brief as to why this Court should force the Bank to apply
the Certificate of Deposit belonging to Barton against the
amount owing by the Kennedys on their loan from the Bank.
None of these theories withstand thoughtful examination.
Correct application of the law to the facts of the case --as correctly stated

result in the conclusion that the

Kennedys are liable for this debt and must pay the judgment
already obtained against them.
Plaintiffs' arguments are a confused mixture of misinterpret.ed facts, irrelevant authority, unsupported concll<sions,
and issues that cannot be raised on appeal.

They seem to

boil down to the following:
1.

Barton is obligated to pay this note, through the

Certificate of Deposit or otherwise, before the Kennedys
becc•rre obligated.
2.

There was an oral agreement that the Certificate

of Ceposit should be tl.e first source of funds on default.
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3.

Barton and the Bank conspired, and/or Barton used

undue influence in his position as Bank Director, to see
that Barton would never have to pay the note.
4.

The equities of the case require Barton, rather

than the Kennedys, to pay the note.
5.

Res judicata does not apply.

These arguments will be addressed, and refuted, separately
in the remainder of this brief.
A.

The Kennedys, as makers and principal debtors on
the note, are primarily liable for this debt,
while Barton, as a guarantor or accommodation
endorser, is only secondarily liable.

The last renewal note on the loan to the Kennedys (copy
attached to Exhibit 58-d), upon which a judgment was had
against the Kennedys on July 19, 1973, was signed by both of
the Kennedys individually and was endorsed on the back by
Barton as follows:
For value received, we hereby guarantee payment of the
within note, waiving demand of payment, protest and
notice of non-payment.
/s/ Charles R. Kennedy
/s/ Rebecca z. Kennedy
/s/ George Barton
The signature of Barton on the back of the note, under words
of guarantee, evidences his status as a guarantor of the
note, rather than as a comaker with the Kennedys.

Language

almost identical to the above endorsement signed by Barton
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was helc by the Supren'e Court of North Dakota to create a
guarantcr relationship.

In Northern State Bank v.

Bell~,

19 N.D. 509, 125 N.W. 888 (1910), the Court held that one
who endorses a promissory note, "For value received, I
hereby guarantee the F<.yment of the within note and hereby
waive presentment, demand, protest, and notice of protest,"
and receives no consideration or benefit from the loan made
to the principal debtor upon the execution of the note, is a
guarantor of payment.
The contract of guaranty
Ibid.;

cr~ates

a secc.ndary liability.

Charlestown Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Wolf, 309 Mass.

547, 36 N.E.2d 390 (1941).

In Charlestown the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts said:
"The word 1 guarantee 1 appearing in the merr.oranocrr.
[on the face of the note) suggests, not a primary, but
a collateral undertaking. The ordinary meaning of the
word is that someone else is primarily liable for a
debt and that the guarantor will pay it if the primary
debtor does not." 36 N.E. 2f 390 at 391.
Under the Ur.ifonn Commercial Code, as enacted in Utah,
Barton is en accommodation party and has a rigrt cf recourse
against the Kennedys, the accommodated parties:

- 6 -
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amenced, §70A-3-415:
(1)
An accommod<:.tion party is one who signs the
instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending
his name to another party to it.

**********
(5)
An accorr~odation party is not liable to the
party accommodated, and if he pays the instrument has a
rigtt of recourse on the instrument against such party.
When he signed this note as guarantor, Barton lent his name
to the Kennedys to enable them to get the loan.
at their

reque·~<t

He did it

and he received none of the proceeds of the

loan --- the Kennedys used the proceeds tc purchase land in
Montana which they still own.

Plaintiffs argue that Barton

received consideration for lending his name (Appellants'
brief, pp. 3

&

6), but these were disputed facts in the-:

trial (R. 685-689, 740-741, 793-794, 801-802, 807-808).
Barton's testimony was that he accepted the check for $499.98
given to him by Kennedy at the time of the original loan
from the Bank as payment on an existing debt owed him by
Kennedy, and not as a "commissicr. ,. for lending his name on
the loan (R. 801-802).

However, even if Plaintiffs had

established that Barton received scme

con~ideration

for the

lendir.c; of his name, that would not affect his status as an
accornrr:odation party.

"Paper may be accommodation paper,
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although 'induced' by a nominal, or even actual, consideration;" the test is whether the accommodation party received
value for lending his name, rather than on the instrument.
11 C.J.S., Bills & Notes §742.
Under §70A-3-415, U.C.A., 1953, and the law governing
the guaranty relationship, Barton's obligation on the note
is secondary to that of the Kennedys.

The Kennedys, as

principal debtors and accommodated parties, are primarily
liable for this note, and their assets should be exhausted
before recourse is had to Barton, either through his certificate of deposit or his other personal assets.
B.

Since Plaintiffs introduced no evidence at trial
regarding an alleged oral agreement concerning
the use of the Certificate of Deposit as first
source of funds on default, that issue cannot be
raised on appeal.

A large part of Appellants' brief (pp. 5-10 of the
brief) presupposes the existence of an oral agreement that
the Certificate of Deposit was to be the first source of
funds on default and cites authority which is supposedly to
the effect that such an oral agreement can be an enforceable
modification of the loan contract between the Bank and the
Kennedys.

This seems to be the major contention of the

Plaintiffs' appeal with respect to the Bank, and it is an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agrument that must fail because the Plaintiffs did not
address the issue at the trial and did not produce any
evidence whatsoever that would tend to show the e:l<istence of
such an oral agreement.
The issue of the existence of tt.e alleged oral agreement
was not raised by the Plaintiffs in their Amer.ded Complaint,
in any of the depositions, or in any of their answers to
interrogatories.

It was raised for the first time in the

affidavit of Cbarles Kennedy dated March 14., 1977, which

wa~.

submitted just before the hearing on the Eank's last Motion
for Summary Judgment before trial.

Because of the existence

of this issue, the Motion for Summary

J~_;dgment "~>·as

denied

and the Bank was compelled to go through a lengthy trial.
At the time of the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment,
counsel for the Bank, believing that the last-minute allegation concerning an oral agreement was n:ade in bad faith and
for the purpose of

del~y,

went on record to this effect and

to the effect that if bad faith could be proved he would ask
for sanctions.
Plaintiffs' conduct at trial evidences the total lack
of substance in this allegation.

At no time while question-

ing witnesses did counsel for Plaintiffs even address the
issue.

That such an oral agreement existed was disputed by
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Defendants and unsupported by the circumstances surrounding
the taking of the loan, as revealed by the evidence actually
given at trial.

The record shows that Barton was questioned

directly by counsel for Defendants as to whether such an
oral agreement existed, and he flatly denied it.

(R. 795).

He was not cross-examined on this point, nor was Kennedy or
any other of Plaintiffs' witnesses directly questioned on
this issue.

The record also shows that the Certificate of

Deposit was not put up by Barton until 60-90 days after the
loan was made to the Kennedys (R. 723-724, 769, 785-787,
795, 897-900), that it was put up at the request of the Bank
president and in order to satisfy the bank examiners, when
the Kennedys failed to secure the loan (R. 897-900, 909),
and that Kennedy assured Barton many times that he would
never have to repay the loan (R. 737, 741-742, 900).

All

of the evidence on the record supports the opposite conclusion
from that urged by Plaintiffs --- that no agreement ever
existed to the effect that the Certificate of Deposit would
be the first source of funds on default.
Since Plaintiffs raised the issue of an alleged oral
agreement, and since they would gain if it were shown to
exist, they had the burden of proof of establishing its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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existence.

This burden of proof was not met;

in fact,

Plaintiffs made no offers of proof whatsoever at trial.
They never even addressed the issue, much less brought forth
any evidence.

Plaintiffs' proposed instruction No. 6 (R.

498), dealing with such an oral agreement, was properly
refused by the court below.

"It is error to instruct the

jury upon issues raised by the pleadings
is evidence to support them."

. unless there

Bethel v. Thornbrough, 311

F.2d 201, 203 (CA 10, Colo., 1962); 75 Am. Jr. 2d, Trial
§651.
Since Plaintiffs did not establish the existence of the
alleged oral agreement at trial, they cannot argue its
existence to this Court now.

As a result, the arguments and

authorities contained in their brief which bear on the
effect such an agreement would have on the parties' obligations are irrelevant and should be disregarded by this
Court.
C.

The Bank, at their election, may pursue their
remedies against the Plaintiffs and not against
the Guarantor Barton.

At several points in their brief Plaintiffs hint at
some kind of conspiracy between the Bank and Barton, or the
use of undue influence on Barton's part, to see that Barton
would never have to pay on the note.

On page 9 of Plaintiff's
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why Barton should be forced to pay the debt] arises from the
unique relationship obviously inherent where Barton is both
a Director and a substantial shareholder of the Bank and is
in a position to influence the Bank management to pursue
only Kennedy rather than pursuing him".

After thus specu-

ating on the possibility that a bank director could use
undue influence in such a situation, Plaintiffs leap to the
concluded fact:

"Such improper influence should not be

countenanced by this Court".

The second proposition does

not follow from the first, and there is no evidence to
support it.

On page 5, Plaintiffs refer to a "knowing and

intentional plan implemented by the Bank and Barton to
relieve Barton of any responsibility whatever," and throughout the brief there are other references to such a plan.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence at the trial, however, to
support their allegations of conspiracy and undue influence.
These are serious allegations, and cannot be inferred from
thin air.

In the absence of any evidence supporting these

accusations they must be disregarded.
Plaintiffs seem to think that it is somehow wrong of
the Bank to try to get the principal debtor on a loan to pay
back the money he borrowed.

On page 10 of their brief they

say that "For the Bank to proceed without enforcing the just
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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obligation against Barton or the collateral is both immoral
and unlawful".

It is neither immoral nor unlawful.

It is

entirely equitable' and is firmly supported by the law.
Upon default, the holder of a note may proceed against
either the maker or the guarantor, or both, at his option.
12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes §1090.

Similarly, the

holder of a note isn't bound to sue an endorser for the
protection of the maker.

Ibid.

Since the liabilities of a

primary obligor and a secondary obligor are several, and not
joint, if the holder gets a judgment against the maker that
does not release parties who are secondarily liable on the
note.

Ibid., §959.

However, even if the holder voluntarily

releases a party secondarily liable, the principle debtor
must still pay the debt.

In First & Citizens Nat. Bank of Elizabeth

City v. Hinton, 216 N.C. 159, 4 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1939),
where the holder of notes discharged the accommodation
endorser, and the maker then claimed that his liability
should be reduced to the extent of the notes signed by the
accommodation endorser, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
said:
"But while the release of the maker from his obligation
releases the surety or endorser, since it discharges
the debt, and while partial release has the same effect
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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pro tanto, the release of the surety or accommodation
endorser does not relieve the principal debtor.
There
is no obligation between the maker and the accommodation
endorser that the latter shall pay the debt, and there
is no equity in favor of the maker to require that the
endorser shall do so."
Additionally, there is no requirement that the holder
of a note attempt to collect against the collateral before
proceeding against the endorsers or maker.

Hurt v Citizens

Trust Company, 128 Ga. App. 224, 196 S.E.2d 349 (1973).
This rule is especially appropriate where collateral has
been supplied by the accommodating party rather than by the
maker.

A holder's authority to sue upon the note without

first exhausting his security has been codified in Utah
through the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §70A-9-50l provides in
part:
When a debtor is in default under a security agreement,
a secured party .•. may reduce his claim to judgment,
foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by
any available judicial procedure.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
1965, §78-37-1 of the judicial code required a creditor to
first exhaust his security before he could get a deficiency
judgment, whether the mortgage was on realty or on chattels.
This statute was amended in 1965 to be consistent with the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and it now applies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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only to mortgages on real property.

This modification was

explained in Justice Ellett's concurring opinion in Olsen v.
Chappell, 20 U.2d 115, 433 P.2d, lOll, at 1012 (1967):
"The cited statute, (78-37-1), U.C.A. 1953) prior to
1965 did provide that mortgages on realty and chattels
must be foreclosed before deficiency could be taken
against the mortgagor; and had this statute been the
law at the time this suit was brought, we can be sure
it would have been raised and argued to us here.
However, the statute cited was amended by Chapter 172,
Laws of Utah 1965, so as to delete the reference to
personal property. Now, the mortgagee need not foreclose
a chattel mortgage before suing upon the note •.. "
These authorities clearly establish that the Bank has a
right to proceed against the Kennedys, who are the principal
debtors on this note, without being legally required to
proceed at the same time against a person who is only secondarily liable.
D.

It is equitable that the Plaintiffs should be
required to pay this debt.

In discussing the equities of this case (Appellants'
brief, pp. 9-10), Plaintiffs claim that Barton should be
forced to repay this loan, rather than the Kennedys, because
"he agreed to do so, and the Bank accepted the obligation in
reliance on the expectation that Barton would pay or that
the Certificate would be used to pay".
simply false.

These statements are

Barton did not unconditionally agree to pay
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the loan --- he agreed to guarantee it; that is, to pay it
only in the event that the Kennedys defaulted on the loan
and had absolutely no assets to pay it.

And the Bank did

not loan the Kennedys the money in the expectation that
Barton would pay it back;

they fully expected that the

Kennedys, who received the money from the loan, would pay it
back.

That is the usual creditor-debtor understanding.

Barton's position was understood from the first to be one of
secondary liability only;

he was to provide insurance for

the loan in the event of absolute default by the Kennedys.
Because the Kennedys were the parties who benefited
from the loan, it would only be equitable to require them to
pay it back.

Barton never received any of the proceeds from

the original loan or from any of the renewals had by the
Kennedys (R. 721, 305-306).

The proceeds from the original

loan were used by the Kennedys to purchase land in Montana
(R. 721, 733) which they still own, and the proceeds from
the various renewals were used in Mr. Kennedy's business
ventures.
Over the years, Barton repeatedly went out of his way
to help his friend Kennedy with the Bank loans.

He origi-

nally recommended the Kennedys for a loan with the Bank of
Ephraim at their request (R. 894), and he signed that note
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as guarantor, again at Kennedy's request (R. 895-896).

When

the Kennedys failed to secure their loan as Barton had
expected they would, and the Bank requested Barton to attach
his own Certificate of Deposit to the note in order to
satisfy the bank examiners, he did so (R. 785-787).

Over

the years he repeatedly helped the Kennedys to get renewals
and extensions on their loans (R. 735-739).

And in 1972, in

order to enable the Kennedys to get still another extension,
Barton paid $4,095 worth of interest on the loan (R. 726,
737-738, 914-918), an amount which the Kennedys did not
repay, and which was awarded Barton in the court below.

At

about the same time that Barton was paying the interest on
the Kennedys' loan, and unknown to him, they were borrowing
money on their Montana land, which was not applied to the
Bank of Ephraim loan, or used to repay Barton (R. 731-732,
799).
Under the facts of this case it would not be equitable
to require Barton to repay the Kennedys' loan when the
Kennedys have sufficient assets to meet this obligation.

It

is their debt and it is just that they should pay it.
E.

Res judicata applies to bar relitigation of
Plaintiffs' liability to the Bank.
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Another large part of Appellants' brief (pp. 16-21)
involves an attempt to explain why the doctrine of res
judicata should not apply in this case with regard to their
claims against the Bank, if that doctrine was used by the
trial court as a reason for dismissing various causes of
action of the Plaintiffs.

If this was a reason used by the

court below, consideration of the two cases --- this case
and the action by the Bank against the Kennedys which resulted in a judgment on July 19, 1973

will show that res

judicata was applicable.
The prior judgment was conclusive as to Plaintiffs'
liability on the note owing to the Bank.

In this action

Plaintiffs are now attempting to assert, as causes of action,
a number of reasons why they should not be compelled to pay
that judgment.

All of these issues, as far as they concern

the Bank, either were or should have been raised as defenses
or counterclaims by the Kennedys in the prior action.
Whether or not they were raised there, if they are relevant
to the issue of Plaintiffs' liability, they are now barred
by res judicata from asserting them.

Under the doctrine of

res judicata, the conclusiveness of the prior judgment
extends not only to matters actually determined but also to
other matters which could properly have been raised and
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determined therein.
Minn., 1965).

Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884 (CA 8

In Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U.2d 404, 285 P.2d

839 (1955), this Court said that:
"Generally, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff is an
adjudication, not merely as to the existence of the
plaintiff's cause of action, but as to the nonexistence of any defenses thereto." 285 P.2d 839 at
841.
And in the same case, the Court held:
"A counterclaim not presented to the court on a matter
involving the same transaction is forever barred." 285
P.2d 839 at 842.
This latter holding was said to follow from the "compulsory
counterclaim rule," codified as Rule 13(a) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which provides
in part:
"A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction."
Under these authorities, Plaintiffs cannot now raise issues
which could properly have been included in the prior action.
A related claim of Plaintiffs' is that this is not the
same cause of action.

They point out that the prior action

was for a judgment on a note, then describe this case as
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involving tort claims plus "additional claims relating to
the certificate"

(p. 19 of Appellants' brief).

It is not

the labels used which determine whether the cause of action
is the same.

In Rhodes v. Jones, supra, it was said:

"A 'cause of action' is a situation or state of facts
which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives
him the right to seek judicial interference in his
behalf." 351 F.2d 884 at 886.
Whatever names the Plaintiffs use, they are attempting to
deny their liability to the Bank, and that question has
already been settled.
Plaintiffs assert that res judicata cannot apply because
their counterclaim was not heard on the merits in the prior
action.

Their counterclaim was dismissed at trial because

they presented no evidence in support of their allegations.
What is important to determining whether a judgment was on
the merits is whether the parties had an opportunity to be
heard.

In 50 C.J.S., Judgments §627 it is said:

"It is not necessary, however, that there should
have been a trial.
If the judgment is general, and not
based on any technical defect or objection, and the
parties had a full legal opportunity to be heard on
their respective claims and contentions, it is on the
merits, although there was no actual hearing or argument
on the facts of the case."
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Since Plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard, the judgment
was on the merits, whether or not the Plaintiffs chose to
substantiate their claims.
The only necessary parties to the question of liability
on the loan made by the Bank to the Kennedys, were the Bank
and the Kennedys.

As far as the issue of Plaintiffs' liabil-

ity is concerned, it must be considered determined by the
July 19, 1973 judgment.

The Plaintiffs cannot now readjudi-

cate this same issue under a claim that the parties are
different, since it was incumbent on them to join any parties
they felt to be necessary in the prior action, after naming
them in any possible counterclaims.

Since Plaintiffs failed

to do so, they should not now be allowed to relitigate the
same issue.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal are totally without
merit and the judgment for the Bank rendered below should be
sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
VINCENT

ohn R.
orneys for Defendants Bank of
phraim, Virgil P. Jacobsen,
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Anderson and Ruel E. Christensen,
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